A. Introduction
The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) ruling of 14 January 2014 1 deserves a thorough evaluation on several accounts: It is the first ever reference by the FCC to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), it represents a continuation of FCC case law aimed at restricting the impact of European Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justices of the European Union (CJEU) on German law as well as questioning Germany's participation in an ever closer European Union, and it has the potential to dictate the future course of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
This case note discusses three aspects of this decision. First, it considers the aims of challenging the youngest measures to contain the euro currency crisis before the FCC, focusing on the question in how far the claims are based on national closure as opposed to an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe. Secondly it analyzes in how far the aims the claims pursue are reflected in the FCC's response. Thirdly, it considers the substantive relevance of this reference, highlighting the surprisingly vague consequences the FCC envisages should the CJEU not re-interpret the OMT decision as the FCC suggests, and illuminating the strategic aims of the reference without deference. In conclusion, it sketches the remaining scope for the EU to engage in or at least facilitate transnational solidarity.
B. The Context of the Claim
The ruling continues a line of FCC case law which resulted from the fact that from 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the common currency, each step towards 330 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 15 No. 02
further EU integration has been challenged before this court. Well after the well-known Maastricht ruling, 2 a group of plaintiffs had already claimed that Germany's entrance into Economic and Monetary Union without a political union would be unconstitutionalwithout success. 3 A similarly constituted group also challenged the financial support for Greece in 2010, 4 and the Constitutional Treaty. 5 While in 1998, those challenging the participation of Germany in the second stage of EMU were isolated in their arguments, the Treaty of Lisbon was challenged by several claimants. 6 The decision of 14 Januarypublished on 7 February 2014-derived from seven challenges against the Germany's participation in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Treaty on Stability, Consolidation and Governance (TSCG), also referred to as Fiscal Compact, which partly also challenge European Union legislation nicknamed the "six-pack."
7 The FCC has delivered its decision on these claims on 18 March 2014. 8 As expected, the FCC rejected the claims, following its ruling on applications for interim relief of 12 September 2012.
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The 14 January 2014 decision to refer questions to the CJEU only affects a partition of those seven claims. These proceedings are still pending before the FCC. On 6 September 2012, the ECB's Governing Council proclaimed conditions for making Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in secondary markets of sovereign bonds in the euro area concerning euro area states receiving support negotiated with the ECB and the EU Commission. One condition was that the Memoranda of Understanding established for receiving support 2014]
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would be complied with, and the other that the OMT was necessary to re-establish rational interest rates for government yields. 10 The mere announcement of OMT's proved remarkably efficient: Interest rates for Spanish and Irish government debt service declined considerably only on grounds of the announcement.
11 However, in Germany, OMT's were perceived as quasi-loans at the expense of domestic tax payers.
12 Accordingly, five out of seven claimants expanded their challenges to encompass the German government's and the Bundestag's (German Federal Parliament) reaction to and participation in those OMTs. The FCC separated these additions from the original claims, 13 and thus enabled itself to refer the questions to the CJEU.
C. The Substance and Purposes of the Claims Raised
This section will consider the content of and the purposes for the five claims, which were not summarized by the FCC.
14 Most of the claimants made available their submissions online, indicating that they consider these claims as part of a political campaign on Germany's correct actions concerning the euro-area crisis.
I. The Claimants and their Applications
Mr. Gauweiler, a former Member of Parliament for the CSU 15 , represented by Professor Murswiek and RA Bub, 16 has a long record of challenging Germany's involvement with the European Union. In challenging the ESM, TSCG and the OMT decision, 17 Gauweiler alleges that the EU institutions act beyond their competences (ultra vires, see for a summary the FCC's ruling on the Lisbon Treaty
18
) and also challenges the unlimited risk for Germany's budget. He stresses that Germany is not represented in the ECB Council in proportion to its 332 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 25 and a publisher. 26 Their principled argument concerning EMU is that Germany's participation is too risky as long as the participating economies are not sufficiently converged and monetary union is not supported by economic union. As in their challenge of the first "bail-out" of Greece, they also relied on the German constitution's social state principle, which in their view underpins the individual constitutional guarantee of property rights of citizens. Regarding the OMT decision, the group's application 27 challenges that OMT's subject the German federal budget to uncontainable risks, thus undermining the budgetary autonomy of the 19 25 Joachim Starbatty. "Alternative für Deutschland" was founded much later than the activities of the group against EMU began. As its name-alternative perspectives for Germany-indicates, the group challenges the frequent reliance on "TINA" (there is no alternative) in debates around the European Union and in particular the euro area crisis. Its aims include that Germany leaves the EU or at least the euro-area, which is supported by populist arguments stressing different national characters in the EU, among other arguments. The party did not gain a sufficient number of votes for representation in the Bundestag so far. 26 Bruno Bandulet. Bandulet has been considered as associated with the dissolved "Bund Freier Bürger," a former grouping which also aimed at standing for parliamentary elections. 
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German parliament through funding foreign states. They also question the conditionality of OMTs as infringing democratic self-governance of affected states. Further, monetary financing by the ECB is seen as not only contradicting Article 125 TFEU, but also as changing the EU into a European Federal State, which again requires a change of the German constitution and a plebiscite. The application is primarily to hold the OMT decision as unconstitutional and thus ineffective. An auxiliary application is made for an obligation of the Federal Government to challenge the OMT decision before the CJEU.
The largest group of claimants is organized by "Mehr Demokratie" (more democracy), a civil society organization represented by the former minister of Justice, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, Christoph Degenhard, Professor at Leipzig University, and Bernhard Kempen, Professor at University of Cologne. 28 "Mehr Demokratie" was founded in 1988, to lobby for a plebiscite on a new German constitution after re-unification. It has focused on promoting elements of direct democracy in Germany and its states as well as ensuring democratic principles in elections. As regards the EU, the NGO was involved in lobbying for the citizens' initiative. As far as the containment of the euro crisis is concerned, "Mehr Demokratie" states on its web page 29 that they pursue a further reform of the EU Treaties through the ordinary Treaty revision procedure under Article 48 TEU. This method comes closest to their ideals because it requires establishing a convention in which national parliaments and civil society are represented. They also claim that they support further EU integration, but in a more democratic form than hitherto. They constitute the latest addition to the euro-challenge, and their constitutional complaint is the largest mass-claim before the Federal Constitutional Court in its history. 30 Their claim 31 in particular focuses on preventing the communization of debt, the resulting risks for the German budget, and ultimately the democratic representation of their clients as well as protecting the rule of law within the EU from being undermined by emergency measures with unpredictable consequences. Thus, the challenges can be interpreted as criticizing the fact that the crisis containment measures did not, in their entirety, take place within the supranational framework of the EU, but rather use intergovernmental instruments such as international Treaties. The applications concerning OMT do not contain any obligation of the federal government to raise a claim before the CJEU. They seek an obligation of the federal government to work towards repealing the OMT decision, an obligation to ensure that liability of Germany resulting from making OMT's is limited and an obligation of the German federal parliament to ensure that it has full control about any payment in support for ailing euro area countries, in order to safeguard its budgetary autonomy. 
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A further group of claimants is represented by the advocate Professor Dr. Markus C. Kerber
32
, whose europolis web page states that his seventeen clients are mainly businesspeople, including for example Olaf Henkel 33 and some owners of small and medium sized businesses. In contrast to the other claims, which are available on the internet in great detail, the information on the web page is restricted to press announcements outlining the general litigation strategy. The information implies that the claimants are interested in re-invigorating the EU's credibility by leading it back to the principles of ordo-liberalism in order to overcome interventionist politics. 34 The applicant aimed, among others, at a reference to the CJEU. Together with Beatrix von Storch, 35 he also raised a claim to annul the ECB Governing Council's OMT decision and ECB guidelines 2012/641 and 2012/18 concerning specific conditions thereof before the CJEU's General Court. This claim was rejected as inadmissible. 36 Following a call for supporters via the web-page of "Zivile Koalition," 37 this claim was raised by more than 5000 citizens. As regards the OMTs, the application is for a challenge of the legality of the decision, which can only be achieved by a reference to the CJEU. 33 Olaf Henkel, who was the former president of the BDI, now also supports AfD, as stated in the last chapter of his most recent book: OLAF HENKEL, DIE EURO-LÜGNER: UNSINNIGE RETTUNGSPAKETE, VERTUSCHTE RISIKEN-SO WERDEN WIR GETÄUSCHT (Munich: Heyne, 2013). 34 The background of the claims is explained in a number of press releases, available at http://www.europolisonline.org/. 35 Beatrix von Storch also supports AfD, and was one of their candidates for the German general elections in Berlin, as is still reported on her web page, http://www.beatrixvonstorch.de/, Feb. 23, 2014. 36 General Court decision in case T-492/12 of Dec. 10, 2013, nyr (available in French and German). 37 Zivile Koalition has its registered office in Berlin, at the same address as B von Storch. Available at: http://www.zivilekoalition.de/aktionen/schluss-mit-der-schuldenunion-raus-aus-dem-esm-zurueck-zurdemokratie. 38 This party results from a merger of the PDS (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus -Party of Democratic Socialism), a successor of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the governing party of the GDR) and some Western German parties, among others a split off from the Social Democrats, after German reunification, www.die-linke.de. 39 New case number 2 BvE 13/13.
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Step Towards National Closure? 335 application on behalf of the LINKE faction in the federal parliament ("Organstreitverfahren"). 40 As regards the OMT proceedings, only the application in the "Organstreitverfahren" is pending. This application is mainly based on a violation of democracy. However, counsel for DIE LINKE also criticize the content of the measures containing the Eurocrisis, and in particular take up an argument that DIE LINKE has already promoted in their challenge to the Treaty of Lisbon: The lack of engagement with social justice, and thus a violation not only of the social state principle within the Federal Republic of Germany, but also against the EU's own normative commitment to a social market economy and social justice. The argument thus goes beyond the territory of Germany by highlighting the social consequences of the conditionality of any support for other Member States. However, as in the challenge of the Treaty of Lisbon, there is also the tendency to claim any social state policy for the German constituent power, thus promoting national closure in social policy, whose EU level equivalent can at maximum consist in coordination of national policies. This contradictory state of affairs is related to a change in position of DIE LINKE towards a more EU friendly stance. As regards the OMT, DIE LINKE apply for the Bundestag to be under an obligation to pursue that the OMT decision is revised and only to give its consent to any individual acquisition of bonds after having obtained comprehensive information.
II. The FCC as Campaign Ground, and the Substantive Reasons
It seems particularly worthwhile to note that the FCC is utilized not only as a forum to substantively discuss the adequacy of actions of the government and even of debates in parliament, but also as a space to demonstrate the wide support for such arguments in the population. This is most obvious in the "Mehr Demokratie" claim, brought by more than 10,000 citizens. However, the claim led by Kerber before the CJEU also attempts to demonstrate that high numbers of claimants can be mobilized. While German procedural law does not allow for mass litigation formally, the public campaign for gaining a high number of supporters suggests that those representing the claimants wish to suggest that the FCC is the only remaining stronghold for democracy.
The substantive arguments brought against the OMT decision specifically are of course partly constrained by past FCC rulings, which again were framed by the arguments developed in earlier proceedings, as discussed below. However, within that frame, the claimants and the applicant also challenge politics substantively. These substantive submissions show some remarkable differences and commonalities. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l [Vol. 15 No. 02
The Schachtschneider group and DIE LINKE concur in highlighting the negative effects of conditionality under the ESM "bailouts" for social policy and the social state principle. Reference to the social state principle had also been made by Mr. Gauweiler in his challenge of the "Greek bailout," 41 though in relation to the risks for purchasing power of citizens in Germany. In these proceedings, Gauweiler does not refer to the social states principle in challenging the OMT decision, though his counsel does mention the social component of Article 23 GG. However, the claimants represented by Schachtschneider rely on the social state principle in challenging the conditionality of the envisaged OMT decisions, again referring to a loss of purchasing power for German citizens through exposure of the German budget to risks emanating from other euro area states. 42 The LINKE application refers to social state principles twice. On the one hand, it states that any expansion of the EU's competence concerning social security and collective bargaining through Memorandums of Understanding must not be approved by the German parliament. 43 On the other hand, they claim that the conditionality of any support through the ESM, as well as through OMT has negative consequences for the welfare state in receiving countries, which they state contravenes Article 23 Grundgesetz and Article 3 paragraph 3 TEU. 44 All the claimants rely on the argument that the lack of limitation for the use of OMTs constitutes an incalculable risk for the federal budget. They argue that this endangers the identity of the German constitution, because the parliament's competence to decide upon the federal budget will be undermined. This is, in their view, a consequence of the fact that the EU violates the prohibition of monetary financing established in Article 125 (2) TFEU. Further, the Schachtschneider group and Mr Gauweiler submit that Article 88 GG only allows a currency union based on stability and an independent ECB. That independence, in their view, presupposes that the ECB does not engage in economic policy. These claimants thus endorse the orientation of EMU on the principles of budget and monetary stability in their endeavor to defend the independence of the German citizens from distortions in the euro area.
Ultimately, while some of the submissions refer to the consequences of the EU policy for other Member States, the applications aim to isolate internal German policy from the unwanted impact of EU policy. This is independent from the political spectrum from which a certain claim emerges. Those claiming that EMU must remain strictly within the 41 The FCC confirmed that the social state principle is part of the "constitutional identity" of Germany, but did not consider it to encompass stability of the currency. 
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conditionality. It only relied on the overall budgetary responsibility of the German Bundestag.
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However, the FCC derived the potential violation of Article 38 GG from the ultra vires character of the OMT decision. This led to a substantive evaluation of that decision under the standards of EU law, as the FCC reads it. In this context, the FCC refers to the conditionality and its impact on national social policy in Member States whose governments are potentially profiting from OMT (paragraph 75). This ultimately rests on the principle established in the Lisbon ruling that the main substance of realizing the social state principle must remain the sole competence of Germany. This limitation again rests on a similar principle of national closure as the limitation of true democracy to the territory of Member States.
The national closure relied upon by some of the claimants remains decisive for the FCC's verdict of the ultra vires character of the OMT decision. The tentative steps in some of the submissions of the LINKE towards invoking the EU's value of social justice have not become relevant for the substance of the ruling. Under the doctrines of the FCC, the EU must mainly remain a passive on-looker in socio-economic policies while the Member States take center stage. This, according to the FCC, also requires the EU to exercise restraint in its monetary policy, and to refrain from correcting market distortions.
E. Conclusion-Is There Any Way Forward?
This result is questionable under two perspectives.
On the one hand, as Justice Lübbe-Wolff stresses in her dissenting opinion, the FCC assumes an indirect competence to scrutinize EU policies. It thus claims for itself to decide central pillars of the EU's governance of the euro area. Even if such a decision would not be taken by a national court, but rather by a national parliament, this would be problematic in that the consequences of this national decision would impact far beyond the nation state. As Lübbe-Wolf puts it Substantively, the question remains whether there is any scope for EMU to develop beyond the constraints of budget and monetary stability, which is utilized to justify strictly supply side oriented socio-economic policies to be imposed on all Member States. In order to overcome that restraint, a teleological interpretation of provisions such as Article 125 TFEU in conjunctions with other provisions of the same Treaty chapter has been proposed. 64 For future critical analysis of European Economic and Monetary Union, one should consider an even wider perspective. It is an historical irony that the European Union has explicitly committed for the first time to social justice, combating poverty, striving for social inclusion and the promotion of solidarity between the Member States and within societies (Articles 2, 3 TEU and Article 9 TFEU) at just the same time when it had to face the impact of the global financial crisis within the euro area. In developing its responses to this challenge, the EU closely followed the specific design of the euro area through the Treaty of Maastricht, which imposes overly strict obligations to achieve so-called financial stability of public budgets if followed literally. The teleological, and indeed systematic interpretation of the EU Treaties would require to interpret the provisions in the chapter on EMU in line with the fundamental values of the EU. This would allow a dynamic development of the EU Treaty base to embrace such economic and monetary policies that can do justice to the EU's commitments to social inclusion and solidarity between Member States.
The question remains whether these commitments permit maintaining national closure in social policy. They may well require EU level social policy initiatives and real solidarity between Member States. 65 If the latter is true, we still need to establish whether and how
